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The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this 
matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) . This appeal was poured 
over to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE MUTUAL RELEASE WAS NOT 
ENFORCEABLE IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND 
NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
1. The trial court's legal conclusion that the release was 
unenforceable because there was not a meeting of the 
minds as to what consideration was being given in 
exchange for the release is a misapplication of the 
doctrine of "meeting of the minds." 
2. The trial court's ruling that there was no meeting of the 
minds as to the consideration being given is an illogical 
conclusion given the trial court's factual finding that 
Hartmark provided the consideration being claimed by VPV. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO 
SUPPORT THE RELEASE WAS INADEQUATE WAS CONTRARY TO THE WELL-
SETTLED CASE LAW IN UTAH. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING HARTMARK RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
$10,370 CHECK MADE OUT TO SCHREYER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE THAT HARTMARK PERSONALLY BENEFITTED FROM ANY CLAIMED 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING HARTMARK TO REPAY THE 
$10,000 CHECK FOR HIS COMPENSATION FOR HIS EFFORTS IN SETTING 
UP VPV WHEN THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT 
AMONG THE PRINCIPALS OF VPV THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO AN AMOUNT 
IN EXCESS OF THE CHECK. 
X. THE TRIAL COURT USED AN ERRONEOUS METHOD TO CALCULATE PLAIN-
TIFF'S DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF THE CELLULAR PHONE AND THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO MAKE THE PROPER CALCULATION. 
XI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO VPV WHEN 
THERE HAD NEVER BEEN A DETERMINATION OF ENTITLEMENT TO FEES. 
XII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING VPV THE COSTS OF ITS 
DEPOSITIONS. 
XIII.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER WRITTEN FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
XI. HARTMARK IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL AND 
ON APPEAL DUE TO VPV'S BREACH OF THE RELEASE. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are none. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final judgment in favor of 
appellee, VIDEO PUBLISHING VENTURES, INC., (hereafter "VPV"), 
following a bench trial in the Third District Court before Judge 
Glenn Iwasaki. 
VPV was a video production company which was operating 
out of the Osmond Studio in Orem. The company was originally based 
in Colorado before it was purchased and moved to Utah. Appellant 
Hartmark was involved in the purchase and reorganization and 
relocation of VPV and became the financial Vice President. His 
duties included paying the debts of the company. 
After several years of unprofitable operations, VPV was 
in financial difficulties. Internal disputes over management arose 
between Hartmark and Sterling Martell, President of VPV. Hartmark 
decided to resign. Shortly thereafter, VPV ran out of money and 
ceased operations. Over two years later, VPV brought this lawsuit 
against Hartmark, et al.,1 claiming that Hartmark owed VPV money 
for alleged misconduct during his employment. 
Hartmark originally brought a Motion to Dismiss claiming 
that Sterling Martell was not entitled to pursue the action against 
him on behalf of VPV. That motion was unsuccessful. VPV sought 
attorney fees for successfully defending against the motion. Judge 
Scott Daniels, who was originally assigned to this case and 
subsequently retired from the bench, did not award attorney fees at 
l
. The remaining defendants settled their disputes with VPV 
prior to trial and are not parties to this appeal. 
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that time but rather, took the question of attorney fees under 
advisement. The case was subsequently assigned to Judge Iwasaki. 
At the close of appellee's case, appellant Hartmark moved 
to dismiss based on a general release signed by both Hartmark and 
VPV on the day Hartmark resigned as Vice President of VPV. The 
release mutually released each party from any and all claims 
against the other "and more specifically a cause of action arising 
out of Mr. Hartmark's employment as an officer of VPV." The 
release was drafted by VPV's attorney who advised VPV to sign the 
release and was present when it was signed. 
VPV argued that the release was not enforceable because 
VPV signed it under "financial or economical duress." VPV claimed 
that Hartmark would not surrender certain company records in his 
possession as Vice President, particularly the company checkbook, 
until he was given a release. Appellee also claimed that there was 
no consideration given for the release because the records and 
checkbook, which Hartmark purportedly exchanged for the release, 
belonged to VPV. 
Hartmark disputed appellee's factual claim that he 
refused to surrender the company records in his control until he 
was given the release. He also countered VPV's claim of "financial 
duress" by showing that the Utah Supreme Court has previously ruled 
that "financial duress" is not a ground for setting aside a 
release. He countered the "lack of consideration" argument by 
showing that the Utah Supreme Court has held that mutual releases 
are, in and of themselves, adequate consideration. 
- 3 -
The trial court, nevertheless, denied Hartmark's Motion 
to Dismiss by ruling that the release was not an enforceable 
contract because there was not a meeting of the minds as to the 
consideration and that the consideration was inadequate, (See 
pages 265-67 of the transcript for the trial court's ruling.) The 
trial court then proceeded with the trial and ultimately dismissed 
many of the claims against Hartmark, but held that Hartmark should 
repay VPV on a few of the claims and entered judgment against 
Hartmark for $18,689.68. 
Hartmark claims that the trial court erred in refusing to 
enforce the general release and that the entire judgment should be 
reversed and all of VPV's claims be dismissed as barred by the 
release. In the alternative, Hartmark claims that the trial court 
made several errors in holding him liable to VPV on each of the 
individual claims. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Pursuant to the terms of his employment agreement 
with VPV, Hartmark was entitled to a salary and reimbursement of 
expenses as Chairman of the Board of Directors and as Vice 
President of VPV in charge of VPV's financial affairs. (Trans, pp. 
211, 213, 285-86) 
2. As the financial officer, Hartmark was responsible 
for signing virtually all checks on behalf of VPV. (Trans, pp. 80, 
174) 
3. The officers of VPV agreed in December, 1988, that 
Hartmark was entitled to receive $11,208 as compensation for his 
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efforts expended in 1988 in creating VPV, as well as reimbursement 
for his expenses incurred. (Trans, pp. 289-90) 
4. Hartmark signed Check No. 1177, made out to himself, 
in the amount of $10,3 70, to compensate himself for his efforts, 
and reimburse his expenses, in setting up VPV, pursuant to the 
December 1988 agreement of the officers of VPV, that he was 
entitled to $11,208. (Trans, pp. 83-88 and D-Ex. 22) 
5. Echochem was a holding company which owned a 
majority of VPV's stock and was owned by Sterling Martell, 
President of VPV, Hartmark, Hugo Gardner, a Director of VPV, Sig 
Schreyer, and Peter Hirschberg. (Trans, pg. 170) 
6. Echochem borrowed $10,000 from Schreyer to make a 
payment to Eva Heiner for stock of another company it was pur-
chasing from Heiner. (Trans, pg. 170) 
7. VPV owed Echochem an amount greater than the amount 
Echochem owed to Schreyer. (Trans, pg. 424) 
8. Hartmark, Gardner and VPV's attorney, Ron Vance, met 
and discussed whether VPV could repay the debt to Schreyer, and 
Vance gave his approval since VPV owed Echochem money. (Trans, pp. 
375, 424) 
9. Hartmark wrote Check No. 1217 to Sig Schreyer, in 
the amount of $10,370, to repay the debt of Echochem to Schreyer. 
(P-Ex. 1) 
10. Vance, as VPV's legal counsel, did not believe that 
the check to Schreyer was in any way illegal, but was perhaps 
simply an accounting error. (Trans, pp. 439-40) 
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11. Hartmark resigned from his position as the Vice 
President of VPV on June 2, 1989, 
12. Hartmark admitted that he took a cellular telephone 
and desk with him when he left VPV in exchange for other personal 
property belonging to him which was needed by VPV. (Trans, pg. 98) 
13. Gardner, as a director of VPV, requested that Vance 
prepare a general mutual release for Hartmark, and Vance prepared 
the release which was paid for by VPV. (Trans, pp. 107-109, 381-
82, 420) 
14. On the day that Hartmark resigned, Hartmark and 
Martell, on behalf of VPV, entered into and signed the mutual 
release prepared by Vance wherein Hartmark and VPV, in exchange for 
the mutual release of the other, released each other from any and 
all claims each may have against the other. (D-Ex. 21) 
15. The release stated as follows: 
GENERAL RELEASE 
Video Publishing Ventures, Inc., a Colorado 
corporation ("VPV"), and Stan Hartmark, for 
and in mutual consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, 
have remised, released, and forever discharged 
and by these presents do for each other, their 
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, 
remise, release and forever discharge each 
other their heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors and assigns of and from all and any 
manner of action and actions, cause and causes 
of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, 
accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, special-
ties, covenants, contracts, controversies, 
agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, 
damages, judgments, executions, claims, and 
demands whatsoever, in law, or in equity, 
which against either party the other ever had, 
now has or which the heirs, executors, or 
administrators of either party, hereafter can, 
shall or may have for, upon or by reason of 
any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the 
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beginning of the world to the date of these 
presents and more specifically a cause of 
action arising out of Mr. Hartmark's employ-
ment as an officer of VPV. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have 
executed this General Release at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on this 2nd day of June, 1989. 
VIDEO PUBLISHING VENTURES, INC. 
by Lsl 
Sterling Martell, President 
Isl 
Stan Hartmark, Individually 
16. Hartmark never told either Martell or Owens that he 
would not surrender the checkbook, he claimed that he did not have 
the checkbook. (Trans, pp. 120-21, 220) 
17. Vance told Martell and Owens that they could not 
obtain the checkbook until VPV signed the release. (Trans, pp. 
120-21, 220) 
18. Hartmark signed the release at Vance's office after 
which time Martell signed the release at the direction of Tom 
Owens, a consultant to VPV, while sitting in Vance's automobile at 
the Draper off-ramp of 1-15. (Trans, pg. 122) 
19. Immediately after signing the release, Martell and 
Owens went to Vance's office and were given VPV's checkbook by 
either Vance or his secretary. (Trans, pg. 155) 
20. The trial court found that Hartmark had in fact 
refused to surrender VPV's checkbook until VPV signed the release 
because it did not believe that it was a coincidence that the 
checkbook was available at Vance's office immediately after the 
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signing of the release by Martell. (Trans, pg. 4 - Trial Court's 
Ruling) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellee filed suit against Stanley R. Hartmark to 
determine Hartmark's liability to appellee regarding Hartmark's 
conduct as an officer and director of the appellee corporation, 
more specifically, a claim that Hartmark owed VPV money for alleged 
misconduct during his employment. 
Hartmark originally brought a Motion to Dismiss claiming 
that appellant was not entitled to pursue the action against him 
based upon the theory that the representatives of appellant did not 
have authority to bring the action against another corporate 
officer of appellant. That motion was denied. 
FINAL DISPOSITION 
After a two day bench trial, a final judgment was entered 
against Hartmark. Hartmark appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Each error asserted in this case is a legal error and is, 
therefore, to be reviewed by the Court for correctness, requiring 
no deference to the trial court's rulings. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There were several errors committed by the trial court in 
its application of the law to the facts presented in this case, any 
of which requires reversal of the trial court's awarding judgment 
to VPV. 
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(1) The trial court's ruling that the mutual 
release was not enforceable is contrary to established legal 
principles and not supported by its factual findings, 
(2) The trial court's conclusion that the consider-
ation given to support the release was inadequate was contrary 
to the well-settled case law in Utah. 
(3) The trial court erred in holding Hartmark 
responsible for the $10,370 check made out to Schreyer because 
there was no evidence that Hartmark personally benefitted from 
any claimed breach of fiduciary duty. 
(4) The trial court erred in requiring Hartmark to 
repay the $10,000 check for his compensation for his efforts 
in setting up VPV when the testimony was that there was an 
agreement among the principals of VPV that he was entitled to 
an amount in excess of the check. 
(5) The trial court used an erroneous method to 
calculate plaintiff's damages for conversion of the cellular 
phone and there was no evidence submitted to make the proper 
calculation. 
(6) The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees 
to VPV when there had never been a determination of entitle-
ment to fees. 
(7) The trial court erred in awarding VPV the costs 
of its depositions. 
(8) The trial court erred in refusing to enter 
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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(9) Hartmark is entitled to costs and attorney fees 
at trial and on appeal due to VPV's breach of the release. 
Any of the foregoing errors, with the exception of the 
award of attorney fees, standing alone, requires complete reversal 
of the trial court's judgment in the VPV's favor* 
CALENDARING 
If, in accordance with established case law, the trial 
court's failure to enforce the mutual release is reversed and the 
judgment reversed, this appeal may clearly be dealt with in an 
unpublished opinion. It would, on the other hand, require new law 
to uphold the trial court's ruling that the release was unenforce-
able, and therefore would require a published opinion if the trial 
court is affirmed on that question. Furthermore, if the release is 
not upheld, and the alternative arguments must be addressed, there 
are questions in the remaining issues dealing with specific awards 
by the trial court which would require published opinion since they 
involve the creation of new law. In particular, the questions 
concerning the trial court's finding that there was a breach of 
fiduciary when there was no personal benefit proved and the 
question of whether VPV's settlement with Sig Schreyer constituted 
an accord and satisfaction of any claim concerning Hartmark. Other 
various rulings by the trial court would also require a published 
opinion if they are upheld since they would constitute new law at 
odds with existing law. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT#S RULING THAT THE MUTUAL RELEASE WAS NOT 
ENFORCEABLE IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND 
NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
When Hartmark claimed that the mutual release barred 
VPV's claims against him, the trial court denied the motion, ruling 
that there was no meeting of the minds as to the consideration 
being given by Hartmark in exchange for the release and that the 
consideration given for the release was inadequate. The court 
ruled from the bench: 
In this matter there seems to be primarily, 
number 1, a nonmeeting of the minds, there-
fore, it is not a mutual agreement that was 
entered into between the parties. The testi-
mony which is prevailing in this matter from 
plaintiffs was that the reason why they had 
executed this general release was to secure 
the books and financial records as well as the 
checkbook in question, and although it was 
partially due to financial stress, that was 
their main motivation for signing the release. 
On the other hand, as was argued very effec-
tively but to no avail by Mr. Bond, that the 
release was a mutual release based upon cer-
tain consideration that was given up by the 
plaintiff, meaning that they would not go 
after further action against the defendant and 
also the defendant would waive any further 
action against the plaintiff, if necessary. 
With those two positions it seemed very appar-
ent that there was not a meeting of the minds 
as to what was contemplated by the release, 
what consideration if any was given. 
Issue of Consideration. The Court has to look 
at the sufficiency or even adequacy of the 
consideration. The court is convinced the 
consideration, if any at all, would be the 
return of certain property which was right-
fully the property of the plaintiff in the 
first place, therefore, it is insufficient 
consideration in that sense. 
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1. The trial court's legal conclusion that the release was 
unenforceable because there was not a meeting of the 
minds as to what consideration was being given in 
exchange for the release is a misapplication of the 
doctrine of "meeting of the minds.11 
The trial court ruled, on its own initiative, that there 
was no meeting of the minds as to the consideration being exchanged 
for the release.2 This was a misapplication of the doctrine. 
The meeting of the minds doctrine requires that the 
parties agree as to the terms of the contract, i.e., what is 
expected of the parties. "Contractual mutual assent requires 
assent by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that 
their minds meet as to all the terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 
575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). 
. VPV never claimed in the presentation of its case that 
there was not a meeting of the minds on the consideration for the 
release. See Trans, pg 243-57 for VPV's arguments as to why the 
release was unenforceable. The trial court on its own initiative 
created the "meeting of the minds" argument for VPV, and then ruled 
favorably upon its own theory. 
It is well settled that a tribunal may not raise theories 
on behalf of a party. Trial courts may not base their rulings on 
issues which are not "an expressed or implied part of [a party's] 
theory." Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Utah State Tax Commission, 847 
P.2d 418 (Utah App. 1993). The sua sponte raising of theories 
causes the tribunal to depart from its passive, impartial role and 
become an active advocate on behalf of one of the parties. 
The interests of justice are not enhanced 
when the court exceeds its role as arbiter by 
reaching out and deciding an issue that would 
otherwise be dead, it not having been litigat-
ed at the time of trial. 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
At no time in the present case did VPV ever attack the 
release for a lack of a meeting of the minds. Had the trial court 
not raised the theory sua sponte, it would never have been raised 
by VPV, since VPV had already rested its case. Any "meeting of the 
minds" challenge to the release was waived by VPV because VPV did 
not raise it. Since the trial court's ruling was beyond the theory 
presented by VPV, it was a nullity and should be summarily 
reversed. Chevron, 847 P.2d 418. 
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There was no dispute in this case as to the written terms 
of the release and what the release formally requires of the par-
ties. It unequivocally provides that each party was releasing the 
other from all claims. The release was plain and unambiguous on 
its face, and therefore should have been enforced as written. John 
Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 
1987) . 
The trial court's failure to recognize the unambiguous 
meeting of the minds of Hartmark and VPV as recorded on the face of 
the release was reversible legal error in and of itself, and is 
grounds for a reversal in this case without any further discussion. 
We will, nevertheless, address the flaws of the trial court's 
analysis to assist the Court. 
The trial court's confusion arose when it violated the 
parole evidence rule and looked beyond the face of the release and 
tried to determine why the parties were willing to enter into the 
release. It concluded, erroneously, that there was not a meeting 
of the minds because there was an additional, unwritten, reason for 
VPV entering into the release. 
The trial court believed VPV's testimony that Hartmark 
refused to surrender the checkbook unless he received a mutual 
release, and that the "main motivation" of VPV in signing the 
release was to recover the checkbook. This factual finding was in 
direct conflict with Hartmark's testimony at trial that he did not 
have the checkbook in his possession at the relevant times, and 
that he did not demand the release before he would surrender the 
checkbook. 
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Somehow, the trial court concluded that since Hartmark 
testified that he did not demand the release in exchange for the 
checkbook, and VPV claimed that he did demand the release in 
exchange for the checkbook, that there was no meeting of the minds 
as to what consideration was being given by Hartmark in exchange 
for the release and, therefore, the release is unenforceable. This 
conclusion is a clear misapplication of the "meeting of the minds" 
doctrine. 
This difference in perception, as to whether Hartmark 
promised to surrender the checkbook in exchange for the release, 
does not mean that the parties did not have a "meeting of the 
minds." From an analytical standpoint, the fact that Hartmark 
provided the full consideration claimed by VPV makes any dispute 
over whether the parties had a meeting of the minds moot. 
The meeting of the minds doctrine arises when a party 
refuses to perform an alleged term of a contract because the party 
claims it did not agree to perform that term. The doctrine then 
excuses the protesting party from performance of the disputed term 
under the theory that the disputed term was never agreed upon. 
If a disputed term has already been performed, or 
consideration provided as in this case, there is no need to utilize 
the doctrine. There is no need to excuse Hartmark from delivering 
the checkbook when VPV has already been given the checkbook. Any 
lack of a meeting of the minds as to what consideration was being 
given for the release was cured on June 2, 1989, when VPV actually 
received the checkbook. Consequently, any question as to whether 
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the parties had a meeting of the minds regarding the checkbook was 
rendered moot. 
By applying the meeting of the minds doctrine to this 
case, the trial court has not excused any performance of a disputed 
term. Rather, the trial court has allowed VPV to refuse to perform 
its part of the bargain after Hartmark has fully provided all 
consideration required from him. This inequitable result is 
clearly not an appropriate application of the doctrine. 
2. The trial court's ruling that there was no meeting of the 
minds as to the consideration being given is an illogical 
conclusion given the trial court's factual finding that 
Hartmark provided the consideration being claimed by VPV. 
(Trans, pp. 22-24 of closing arguments) 
The apparent inconsistency in expectations as to the consid-
eration being given for the release is also immaterial in this case 
because the discrepancy is eliminated by the trial court's factual 
finding that Hartmark, contrary to his testimony, did in fact 
refuse to surrender the checkbook until after the release was 
signed. In other words, the trial court found that Hartmark 
expected to deliver both his promise to forbear and the checkbook 
in exchange for the release, and VPV expected to receive both 
Hartmark's promise to forbear and the checkbook in exchange for the 
release. 
Based on the trial court's factual findings, there was no 
inconsistency between the mindsets of the two parties to the 
contract. Both expected, and in fact received, the exact consid-
eration for which the trial court found they bargained. They had 
a meeting of the minds. The only logical conclusion the trial 
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court could make is that there was a meeting of the minds as to 
what consideration was given. 
The trial court's ruling that there was not a meeting of 
the minds is not only a misapplication of the doctrine, it is 
contrary to its own factual findings that Hartmark and VPV had the 
same mindset.3 It must, therefore, be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO 
SUPPORT THE RELEASE WAS INADEQUATE WAS CONTRARY TO THE WELL-
SETTLED CASE LAW IN UTAH. (Trans, pg. 241) 
In ruling that there was inadequate consideration given 
for the release, the trial court stated: 
The court is convinced the consideration, if 
any at all, would be the return of certain 
property which was rightfully the property of 
the plaintiff in the first place; therefore it 
is insufficient consideration in that sense. 
(Trans, pg. 267) 
Even assuming that the return of VPV's property, standing 
alone, would not constitute adequate consideration to support the 
release, there is other adequate consideration to support the 
release. The trial court's legal conclusion totally ignores, 
Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and 
given in exchange for a promise. Simmons v. California 
Institute of Technology, 34 Cal. 2d 264, 272, 209 P.2d 
581, 586 (1949); See Colorado National Bank of Denver v. 
Bohm, 286 F.2d 494, 496 (9th Cir. 1961) . Promises made by 
a party pursuant to a bilateral contract to do an act or 
to forbear from doing an act that would be detrimental to 
the promisor or beneficial to the promisee may constitute 
the consideration for the other's promise. Sugarhouse 
Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); 
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 613, 237 P.2d 
823, 825 (1951) . For the mutual promises of the parties 
to a bilateral contract to constitute the consideration 
for each other, the promises must be binding on both par-
ties. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin. 1 F.2d 687, 688 
(3d Cir. 1924). 
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without any legal basis or explanation, the unambiguous written 
mutual promises of VPV and Hartmark to release all claims and 
forbear from suing each other. Such mutual promises, without 
anything more, are clearly adequate consideration for each other as 
a matter of law. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 613, 
237 P.2d 823, 825 (1951). The Court expressly held in Allen that, 
"mutual promises in each of which the promisor undertakes some act 
of forbearance that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to 
the promisor or beneficial to the promisee and neither of which are 
void, are 'sufficient consideration' for one another." Id. 
Hartmark, by signing the release, promised to forbear 
from suing VPV. This was a promise detrimental to him and benefi-
cial to VPV.4 His promise to forbear, therefore, constitutes 
adequate consideration for VPV's promise to forbear -- even if the 
surrender of the checkbook is not included as consideration. The 
trial court's failure to recognize the legal effect of the mutual 
promises was an error of law which must be reversed. 
Inasmuch as the trial court's ruling that there was no 
meeting of the minds was a misapplication of the doctrine, and its 
conclusion that there was no adequate consideration to support the 
release violated well-established Utah law, the trial court's 
ruling that the release was not valid was erroneous. The trial 
court's failure to dismiss VPV's complaint was therefore reversible 
4
. VPV should be estopped from asserting that the release is 
unenforceable. Hartmark has honored his promise to forbear and did 
not bring various claims which he could have asserted against VPV. 
Had he done so, such claims could have offset the judgment awarded 
against him. To allow VPV to now renege on its promise to not 
bring any action against Hartmark is inequitable. 
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error. Hartmark is entitled to have the entire judgment against 
him reversed. 
Hartmark argues in the alternative that the trial court 
erred in reaching each of the awards as set forth below. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING HARTMARK RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
CHECK MADE OUT TO SCHREYER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT 
HARTMARK PERSONALLY BENEFITTED FROM ANY CLAIMED BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY. (Trans, pp. 18-19 of closing arguments) 
Echochem owed $10,000 to Schreyer, but it didn't have the 
money to pay him. VPV owed Echochem more than enough to pay the 
debt to Schreyer. Hartmark, along with Gardner, consulted VPV's 
attorney who advised him that it was permissible for VPV to pay 
Echochem's debt to Schreyer so Hartmark made out Check No. 1217, 
payable to Schreyer in the amount of $10,370. VPV claimed that 
this was a breach of his fiduciary duty without ever explaining how 
it was a breach. 
VPV's own attorney testified that in his legal opinion 
there was nothing illegal about the payment to Schreyer, only that 
the manner of repayment was "sloppy" from an accounting point of 
view. (Trans, pp. 439-40) There was no contradiction of this 
testimony by VPV. Hartmark merely followed his lawyer's advice. 
Without any legal analysis or support for its conclusion, 
the trial court held that Hartmark had made an unauthorized 
payment. The trial court never explained how this amounted to a 
breach of his fiduciary duty. Nor is there any legal explanation 
as to why Hartmark should be personally liable for writing the 
check to Schreyer when VPV failed to prove that Hartmark personally 
benefited from the check to Schreyer. If Hartmark did not receive 
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any personal benefit from the check, where is his conflict of 
interest that would constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty? 
As a matter of law, Hartmark did not breach any fiduciary 
duty. He acted on the advice of VPV's attorney. At best, he may 
have made a mistake in judgment, but such mistakes in business 
judgment do not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty so as to 
create personal liability. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING HARTMARK TO REPAY THE 
$10#000 CHECK FOR HIS COMPENSATION FOR HIS EFFORTS IN SETTING 
UP VPV WHEN THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT 
AMONG THE PRINCIPALS OF VPV THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO AN AMOUNT 
IN EXCESS OF THE CHECK. (Trans, pp. 14-16 of closing argu-
ment) 
The trial court ruled that there was "no competent 
evidence" that Hartmark was entitled to $10,000 in compensation and 
reimbursement for his efforts in setting up VPV, and therefore 
required him to repay the $10,000 check. The ruling is contrary to 
the evidence presented by Hartmark, Gardner, and Vance that there 
was an agreement between the principals of VPV that he was entitled 
to more than $10,000, evidenced in a memorandum, which was intro-
duced without objection into evidence as exhibit D-22. Such 
evidence was clearly competent. Whether or not evidence is compe-
tent is a legal question, reviewable for correctness. Since there 
was not any objection to the competency of the evidence of the 
agreement, the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT USED AN ERRONEOUS METHOD TO CALCULATE PLAIN-
TIFFS DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF THE CELLULAR PHONE AND THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO MAKE THE PROPER CALCULATION. 
(Trans, pg. 20 of closing arguments) 
The trial court found that Hartmark converted the 
cellular telephone and awarded damages in the amount of $950. The 
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trial court took the purchase price -- $1,000 -- and subtracted the 
value of the phone at the time of trial -- $50. (Trans, pg. 3 of 
trial court's ruling) This is not the appropriate method of deter-
mining damages. 
The Court of Appeals explained in Henderson v. For-Shor 
Co. , 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1988), that the appropriate 
measure of damages for conversion is the fair market value of the 
property at the time of the conversion. "[I]n order to be entitled 
to recover his actual damages, the claimant must provide some 
competent evidence of the property's fair market value at the time 
and place of conversion." Frost v. Eggeman. 638 P.2d 141, 144 
(Wyo. 1981). 
Since there was absolutely no evidence introduced at 
trial as to the fair market value at the time of the conversion, 
plaintiff, VPV, failed to prove its case. VPV conceded in its 
closing arguments that they were going from the new price of 
$1,000. (Trans, pg. 29 of closing arguments) Consequently it is 
not entitled to any damages for it alleged conversion of the tele-
phone. The trial court's erroneous award should therefore be 
reversed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO VPV WHEN 
THERE HAD NEVER BEEN A DETERMINATION OF ENTITLEMENT TO FEES. 
(Trans, pg. 485) 
This case was originally assigned to Judge Daniels who 
entertained a motion by Hartmark to dismiss for lack of corporate 
authority to bring the lawsuit. Hartmark's motion was unsuccessful 
because Judge Daniels held there was a question of fact. VPV 
sought attorney fees claiming that the motion was frivolous. Judge 
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Daniels took the request for attorney fees under advisement for 
later determination depending on the success of the factual claim. 
Hartmark was unsuccessful on the facts so VPV renewed its 
request for attorney fees. Without any ruling as to why VPV was 
entitled to attorney fees, Judge Iwasaki set the amount of fees at 
$500, There has never been a determination and/or ruling that VPV 
is entitled to any fees. An award of fees without a determination 
as to entitlement, is erroneous as a matter of law. Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) . The trial court's award 
of $500 in legal fees should therefore be reversed. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING VPV THE COSTS OP ITS 
DEPOSITIONS. (Record pg. 484) 
The trial court erroneously awarded VPV $682.20 for the 
depositions of Hartmark and Gardner, and for copy costs of the 
depositions of its own witnesses, Martell and Owens. It is well-
settled law in Utah that deposition costs are not recoverable 
unless the depositions "appeared essential for the development and 
presentation of the case. Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684 (Utah 
App. 1990). Depositions are necessary only when the complex nature 
of the case prevent a party from completing discovery through less 
expensive means. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing. 
Ltd. , 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988) . The party seeking 
recovery of deposition costs has the burden of proving the 
necessity of the deposition. VPV presented no explanation as to 
why it could not have performed discovery through less expensive 
means such as interrogatories and request for production of 
documents. At best, VPV merely claimed that the depositions were 
in fact used and were helpful. This does not satisfy VPV's burden 
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of proof. Consequently the award of deposition costs should be 
reversed.5 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER WRITTEN FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. (Record pg. 481) 
The trial court entered its rulings from the bench with 
minimal out findings. Its rulings did not address or resolve many 
of the disputed facts in this case, nor do they set forth the trial 
court's full analysis. The trial court's rulings are ambiguous and 
incomplete in many respects. It is a denial of due process for a 
tribunal to not enter adequate findings that reveal the trial 
court's analytical process in reaching its decision. Adams v. 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 
1991). Whether the findings are adequate is a question of law 
which this Court may review for error. Id. Many of the factual 
disputes in this case have more than one possible resolution. 
Given such a "matrix" of possible findings, the trial court's 
findings may not be implied. Id. Hartmark specifically requested 
that VPV set forth complete findings of fact, but VPV refused. Any 
lack of findings should therefore be found or implied in Hartmark's 
favor. 
IX, HARTMARK IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL AND 
ON APPEAL DUE TO VPVfS BREACH OF THE RELEASE. (Record pg. 
435; Trans, pg. 258) 
Hartmark requested attorney fees below, as damages for 
VPV's filing of this case in contravention of the release, but was 
. VPV claim $106.95 in copying costs for copies of the 
depositions of its own witnesses. Such a claim is totally without 
legal support in the code, the rules of civil procedure, or case 
law. Even if the costs of the depositions are allowed on appeal, 
the award must be reduced by the $106.95 copying costs. 
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denied based on the trial court's erroneous ruling that the release 
was unenforceable- Hartmark renews that request at this time, and 
he requests his attorney fees and costs on appeal should he prevail 
in reversing the trial court's ruling invalidating the release. As 
a direct result of VPV's filing of the suit below, in contravention 
of the release, Hartmark has been forced to incur attorney fees 
below and on appeal, which fees are a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of VPV's breach of the release. 
An appellant which prevails on appeal, may be awarded 
attorney fees as part of the appeal even though the appellant was 
not awarded fees below if the appellant would have been entitled to 
fees below had the trial court made the proper ruling as determined 
on appeal. AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy. 714 P.2d 289 
(Utah 1986). Had the trial court properly applied the law below 
and recognized the validity of the release, Hartmark would have 
been entitled to his attorney fees as a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of VPV's breach of the release. Hartmark, therefore, 
respectfully requests an award of fees should he prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's invalidation of the General Release 
agreement was a misapplication of the doctrine of the meeting of 
the minds. It was also contrary to the factual findings of the 
trial court which showed that both parties expected, and in fact 
received, the exact same consideration. The trial court's conclu-
sion that there was not adequate consideration to support the 
release is directly contrary to Utah case law which states that 
mutual promises to forbear constitute consideration for each other 
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without any additional consideration. The entire judgment should 
therefore be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to 
allow the trial court to determine Hartmark's damages, including 
attorney fees at trial and on appeal, for VPV's breach of the 
release. 
If the Court concludes that the release was unenforce-
able, then Hartmark argues that the trial court committed error 
with respect to each award which require that each award be 
reversed individually as specifically set forth above. 
DATED this 13th day of April, 1995. 
SMITH Sc HANNA 
F7~Kevin Bond 
Perri Ann Babalis 
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